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1.	The tossing coin analogy against causalist positions
Do "natural selection" and "genetic drift" name causes of biological evolution? During the past few years, this question has been discussed intensely in the philosophy of biology. On the one hand are those who answer positively: Sober, Rosenberg, Millstein, Brandon, Bouchard, Pfeifer… I will call them the causalists. On the other hand are those who argue that “natural selection” and “genetic drift” refer to mere statistical effects because of the role played by probabilities in contemporary evolution theory. In a series of articles published since 2000, Walsh, Matthen, Ariew, and, for a period, Lewens (collectively referred to as WALM) have forcefully defended this position. Here, I will consider an argument put forth by Mohan Matthen and Andre Ariew (M&A) in 2002 and show that contrary to what they claim it does not establish that all causalist positions are untenable.
Let us get to the heart of the matter by presenting the coin-tossing analogy that is the pivot of M&A's argument. It appears in the discussion of the first variant of causalism that they consider, Sober’s causalism, which identifies selection and drift with forces (1984).
	But does it really make sense to say that drift is a force or, more generally, a cause of change that acts independently of selection? Consider this analogy. You toss a coin four times. What would explain the outcome two heads? Answer: the physical set-up of the coin-tossing trials. What would explain the outcome four heads? The same thing: that is, the same physical set-up. Though the first result is more probable, the same setup explains both outcomes equally. <...> If the physical set-up is the only thing relevant to the two-head outcome, then nothing else is available to explain the four-head outcome. (2002, 60)
M&A’s are right with respect to coin-tossing, but one can infer a lot less from this analogy than M&A believe. However, let us first acknowledge what it contributes.
What does the coin-tossing example demonstrate? That when a type of outcome depends on chance, different outcomes may have the same probabilistic cause (here, it’s the relevant physical set-up). This is the distinctive mark of a probabilistic cause. Let us make clear what "probabilistic cause" means in this context. It is a cause determining not what will happen for sure, but the probability of various possible effects. This is how M&A use this expression later in the article (63). As Glymour summarizes it, in this particular sense, "probabilistic causes" are causes that "determine the probability of their effects" (2003, 1413). Probabilistic causal explanations are quite difficult to handle. Whereas, with classic deterministic causes (causes that totally determine their effect), a difference in the effect obliges one to presume a difference in the cause, this is not so for probabilistic causes. As a consequence, Sober’s inference “if genotype frequencies depart from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, some force must have been at work” (1984, 34) is a sophism.​[1]​ It supposes that two different outcomes cannot result from the same forces/causes, even though these forces/causes - drift and selection - are supposed to be probabilistic. (It is a sophism when applied to real cases of evolution, that is to finite populations.) As M&A note, with probabilistic causes “change might have the same cause as equilibrium” (60). 
The fact that a probabilistic cause explains equally several outcomes has another remarkable consequence. It entails that an assertion such as "it is the probabilistic cause A rather than the probabilistic cause B that is responsible for the effect E” is unjustifiable if A and B can both be probabilistic causes of E. It does not matter whether E is more probable supposing A than supposing B. You cannot deduce from the fact that E is improbable supposing B, that E has been caused by A. Though a four-head outcome is more probable with a biased coin favouring heads than with a fair coin, you cannot deduce from a four-head outcome that the coin used was indeed biased.
I agree with M&A's refutation of Sober's theory of forces. It is only when they engage in a more general refutation of causalist conceptions that I part ways with them. Their aim at that point is to demonstrate that the probabilistic nature attributed to both drift and selection undermines every attempt to discriminate between their respective contributions when considering a concrete case of biological evolution (the evolution of a finite population over some period).
2.	A Naïve Theory of the Causal Action of Natural Selection 
As M&A observe, like many causalists, Sober seems to think that "one can retrospectively identify drift in particular evolutionary histories, not simply in stochastic aggregates" (61). Before engaging in the refutation of this widespread causalist assumption, they explicate it and identify it with a more definite position:  
Histories of natural selection consist, after all, of collections of individual events: births, deaths, matings, mutations, etc. Some of these events are predictable on the basis of advantageous traits (that is, vernacular fitness), others are not. In the first kind of case, we have, as some say, “discriminate” sampling, in the second, “indiscriminate”. And so one might think that one can fix the exact role of vernacular fitness and of drift by looking more minutely at individual events and determining when discriminate sampling has been at work, and when indiscriminate. In this way, one apportions the outcome respectively to fitness and drift. (61)
Beatty is the first, it seems, to have elaborated the idea that selection is a form of "discriminate sampling" and drift a form of "indiscriminate sampling" (1984). Since then, the association of selection and drift with sorts of sampling has been adopted by many philosophers of biology. Yet, two causalists, such as Millstein and Brandon, who both make use of this association, can still defend very different positions. The causalist described here by M&A is someone who is nearer to Millstein than to Brandon. Millstein claims that is possible to distinguish evolutions in which some selective process has taken place from those is which no such process took place by looking at whether some relevant physical have indeed played "a causal role in the differences in reproductive success" (2002: 35). On the contrary, Brandon rules totally out that it may make sense to consider processes operating at the level of individual life stories; he defends that the issue has to be settled by focusing exclusively on what happens at the levels of population changes.​[2]​ Strange though it may seem, the probability-based arguments of M&A will, in the end, show more effective against Brandon's version of causalism than against the life stories oriented version presented here by M&A. This version, however, is apparently endorsed by no one as an explicit theory. Millstein is not willing to go as far as that. As a matter of fact, she refuses the idea that it might be possible to "fix the exact role of vernacular fitness and of drift by looking more minutely at individual events".​[3]​ So the causalist described here by M&A appears to be a position implicitly endorsed intuitively by many, but a theory claimed by no one. Let us suppose, imaginary Mildred is defending explicitly such a theory.
For the sake of argument, M&A imagine the train of thought of Mildred while looking at the deaths of two organisms, O1 and O2, who “otherwise very similar, differ in (vernacular) fitness because O1 has better eye-sight than O2”. Mildred is supposed to know the two following facts: 
C1: O2’s  bad eye-sight leads to its falling of a cliff. It dies and O1 survives
C2: O1 is killed by a lightning strike – the difference of visual acuity was irrelevant to this event.
According to M&A, Mildred will first remark that:
In the two cases, there is evolution since the genetic frequency in the population changes (the trait of good eye-sight which O1 possesses, advances somewhat in C1 and loses a little in C2)”. 
Then, she will think accordingly that:
C1, however, seems to be a case in which the difference in vernacular fitness (the difference in eyesight) contributed to evolution, and  C2 one in which a chance event thwarted the fitness difference that drives natural selection”. 
This will lead her to conclude that:
Natural selection is the cause of evolution in C1, and that it consists, over a longer period of time, of “predictable” (or fitness-biased) cases like C1, but that it excludes anomalous (or fitness-indiscriminate) cases like C2. (62)
In the end, Milldred will even come to think that it is “plausible to say that something else – drift?  neutral selection? – is operating in C2.” Although this train of thought may appear rather convincing intuitively, M&A’s negative judgement is definitive. Such reasoning must be condemned, they say, because it “violates sound probabilistic thinking”. (62)
Why does it violate sound probabilistic thinking? Because probabilistic causes entail an indeterminacy which goes both forward and backward, as the case of flipping coins shows. What makes it impossible to predict, if not probabilistically, the outcome of four tosses is also what makes it impossible to explain afterwards why the outcome was 4 heads, rather than, let’s say, 2 tails and 2 heads. The reason for this is simple: the outcome does not retroact on its cause. If the cause is probabilistic, it remains so no matter what the outcome. Once the tosses have occurred, there is no doubt about the outcome, of course, but the part supposedly played by chance (or by unknown factors) has not changed. So, insofar as the probability is supposed to mirror the role of chance (or unknown factors), the outcome does not matter. It is contrary to “sound probabilistic thinking” to suppose the contrary.​[4]​ 
This argument leads them to the following conclusion :
As long as we are dealing with the causal factors that make a probabilistic difference of evolutionary outcomes, then, we have to resist the temptation to say that the two cases above <C1 and C2> are distinguishable in terms of relevant factors (64).​[5]​
The problem with M&A's argument is not what they say about probabilistic causes, but how it applies to biological evolution. Of what sort are the probabilistic causes referred to when considering biological evolution? It does not really matter. It makes no difference whether you apply the argument to probabilistic causes in the guise of a general physical set-up or in the guise of dispositional properties such as fitness. If you consider a physical set-up - a series of characteristics describing O1, O2 and their common ecological niche – this set-up will be the probabilistic common cause for the deaths of both O1 and O2. Depending on its details, it will be either a selection or a drift (non-selection) set-up. Otherwise,  you can consider the fitness of O1 as the probabilistic cause of O1's death in a determinate niche, and the fitness of O2 as the probabilistic cause of O2's death in this same niche. Then, depending on whether the two fitnesses are different or equal, it will be a situation of selection or of drift (non-selection). So whatever way you look at a biological evolution, it seems as though you are faced with probabilistic causes. 
What is wrong with this line reasoning? It ignores biases. The analogy between games of chance and biological evolution is misleading because it overlooks the question of biases. Now, selection is a biased stochastic process, as its identification with a discriminate sampling process stresses. There is selection when selective factors, such as good or bad eyesight, bias chance. And, biased chance (or chance with biases) can sometimes be analyzed very differently from unbiased chance. Let us notice that both Millstein and Brandon miss this fundamental point, when they associate discriminate and indiscriminate sampling with two different set-ups for extracting balls at random from an urn.​[6]​
Let us turn to an example similar to the one used by M&A to explain how, contrary to widespread opinion, fitness as well as any other probabilistic property may disappear from the causal explanation of an evolutionary outcome whereas probabilistic properties cannot be similarly eliminated when explaining the outcomes of game of chance. Suppose two opposite characters  and #, such as good and bad eyesight, which depend on one or more genes. And suppose a population made of  both Fs who have , and #Fs who have #. The Fs have an advantage over the #Fs if their probability of dying old is greater than that of the #Fs.  Or, in other words, Fs have an advantage if the life expectancy of an F (at birth) is greater than that of a #F. (For simplicity's sake, we consider life expectancy, which is an element of fitness, rather than fitness itself).
If probabilities are indeed necessary to predict the advantage that an F may gain because of possessing the trait , they may not be needed afterwards when the goal is to determine whether or not possessing trait  has indeed conferred an advantage to Fs. Often, the causes of the deaths of Fs and #Fs are sufficient to determine this, as Mildred's train of thought suggested. If the negative consequences of having # have had a part in the death of some #Fs, then Fs have been advantaged and #Fs disadvantaged. Probability plays no role there. The cause of death of O2 is his poor eyesight, if he fell into the ravine because, although he was looking in the right direction, he did not see the end of the cliff or he saw it too late, whereas O2*, which is identical to O2 except for his good eyesight,  would have seen it sufficiently in advance to avoid falling in it. (In order to determine precisely the causal impact of the factor eyesight, O1 must be replaced by O2*). There is no concealed probability in such a counterfactual. A difference of eyesight may indeed act as a "determinist difference" in some circumstances.​[7]​ It is the case if in the same circumstances the typical eyesight of an F makes one see the ravine early enough to be able to stop largely before falling in it.
Probabilities can be dispensed with in giving causal explanations of concrete cases of evolution because chance or unpredictability in evolution concerns the feature circumstances-encountered rather than the feature advantage. In other words, what is systematically dependent on chance or on unknown factors in evolution is whether a definite organism will meet circumstances in which having or not having a determinate character will be critical.   Yet whether the possession of this character will be critical in some definite circumstances need not depend on chance (or if it depends on chance, it is on a more limited chance, one that concerns only a part of what was taken into account when fixing the fitness values).​[8]​ Neither chance nor fitness need be involved when the aim is to explain causally why in some definite circumstance O2 fell and died but the fictitious O2* (identical to O2 except for his good eyesight) would have survived because he would not have fallen. The circumstances and the properties of O2 and O2* determine totally the outcome (falling or not). Here lies the decisive difference with the coin tossing case. A question about what caused the outcome of four heads brings us back directly to the physical set-up of the four tosses (the circumstances of the tosses and the properties of the coin), which is, as we know, a probabilistic cause. The question about whether a selective trait (i.e. a bias) had a critical role in producing a determinate outcome (like death or reproduction) in definite circumstances, on the contrary, does not bring us back necessarily to a probabilistic cause, be it the general set-up  described above (O2's and O2*'s properties and the characteristics of their common ecological niche)  or O2's and O2*'s fitnesses. Rather, it brings us back to the particular conditions that caused that outcome. And, these may determine fully the relevant outcome for the real individuals as well as for their fictitious counterparts, which differ only with respect to the selected traits. In other words, biases may be deterministic factors in the sense that they make a deterministic difference to evolutionary outcomes, not a probabilistic difference. And when there are not, the difference they make to evolutionary outcomes can usually be calculated.​[9]​  So, whether a bias has had a causal role in producing a significant evolutionary event is easy to establish. When the circumstances provoking such an event, let say the death of O2, would not have provoked the same thing for its fictitious counterpart (O2*), the selective factor differentiating the two individuals has had a causal role. If the outcome is the same for both individuals, it has not. 
In summary, the symmetry that exists with unbiased chance between prediction (telling the outcome from the cause) and retrodiction (telling the cause from the outcome) may disappear once the chance is biased and the question concerns the role played by biases. Chance (or unknown factors) acting on which circumstances an individual will encounter in his lifetime makes it indeterminate (or unpredictable if not in a probabilistic manner) when he will die and from what. It is, therefore, indeterminate (or unpredictable) whether the circumstances that will cause his death will give a decisive part to some selective factor (a bias). Nevertheless, afterwards, given his life history, it will usually be totally determinate (and consequently possible to tell) whether or not some bias or other played a decisive part in his death.​[10]​
Since the question of the causal action of natural selection in an actual case of biological evolution comes down a question about whether or not selective factors have played a causal role in this evolution, there will usually be a determinate answer after the event even if there was no determinate answer before the event. In fact, on the basis of the role played by selective factors in the significant evolutionary events of individual lives, the action of natural selection will be measurable for concrete cases of evolution, in principle. To get a very rough idea of how the idea developed so far can give rise to an intuitive and coherent measure of the action of selection and drift, let us consider an oversimplified example. (This measure, of course, need not be really applicable in practice, it must just make sense by being applicable would we have the right information.) Let us suppose that every year for eight years, 125 Fs and 125 #Fs were born.  Let us assume as well that of these 2000 individuals, 500 Fs and 600 #Fs (a differential of 100 deaths), had died before reaching two years of age, and that 100 #F deaths were due to the organisms’ visual deficiency (case 1). What conclusion should we draw from this?  That in eight year period, the change from the ratio of Fs to #Fs at birth to the ratio of Fs to #Fs at age two was due exclusively to natural selection. Incidentally, let us notice that we do not take into consideration the expectancies of reaching the age of two or the fitnesses of Fs and #Fs . We just consider how many Fs and #Fs died before the age of two and from what they died (see below, for the difference with a Brandonian type of account). If, oddly enough, these 500 Fs and 600 #Fs had all died from diseases, lightning strikes and the like, so that no death of an #F could be attributed to their bad eyesight trait, then the change would have been due to drift. If only 30 #Fs had died from their visual deficiency then 30% of the change would have resulted from selection and 70% from drift. If the same number of Fs and #Fs, let say 400, would have died and the death of 100 #Fs would have resulted from their visual deficiency, then selection would have acted as strongly as in case 1. But, drift would have counteracted its action by unpredictably producing the unbalanced effect of killing 400 Fs but only 300 #Fs. We cannot take the time now to consider more complicated cases. However, let us just mention that by using such a simple principle for measuring the actual action of selection and drift, one can solve a series of frequently discussed puzzles, such as the one Beatty formulated about dark and light moths.​[11]​
3.	i- and e-causalists
Let us see now how the type of argument put forth by M&A, and more generally by WALM, helps clarify the issue of whether or not selection and drift deserve the status of causes​, and finally demonstrates Mildred's causalism to be the only defendable one.
Indeed, WALM's thinking sheds light both on the differences of position among the causalists and on what "cause" means in this context. It shows that within the declared causalists there are in fact two types: i-causalists and e-causalists. Naive causalists or i-causalists, such as Mildred, defend the claim that one can see the action of selection or drift at the level of the events affecting the lives of individuals, at the i-level as M&A say. E-causalists, such as Brandon, defend the claim that the action of selection and drift can be seen only at the populational or ensemble level, the e-level. WALM's analyses also help make precise the idea that "selection" and "drift" refer to causes by making clear how causes contrast with statistical effects relative to this particular issue. 
A simple example can help explain both the difference between i- and e-causalists and the contrast between causes and statistical effects. Let us suppose two identical cases of evolution at the e-level. They are identical in that they have the same starting point S and the same end point E. At S there is a population in a niche whose genotype includes a couple of alleles (A,a) at some locus such that AAs and Aas have a good eyesight and aas see badly. At E, there is an increase of 10% of allele A over three generations, whereas all other parameters (population size, environment, etc.) remain unchanged. Now assume that these two identical cases of evolution at the e-level result from two different histories at the i-level. In the first case, the 10% increase of allele A is a consequence of a comparatively high death rate of aas before puberty due to their visual deficiency. Many aas died in accidents resulting from their poor eyesight. In the second case, the increase of 10% of allele A is a consequence of a comparatively high death rate of aas before puberty due to events that have nothing to do with their visual deficiency. They were struck by lightning, killed by diseases, etc.
Considering these two cases, the e-causalist will conclude that selection and drift are acting similarly in both, since both are identical at the e-level. That is indeed what Brandon defends. If S entails a difference of fitness between aas on the one side and Aas and AAs on the other side, and this further entails a 10% increase of allele A over three generations, then both cases of evolution will be due to selection. If the entailed increase is above or under 10%, then both cases will be due to a combination of selection and drift, the action of drift being measured by the difference between what happened and what was to be expected.​[12]​ On the contrary, the i-causalist will argue that one must make use of the available information on what happened at the i-level in each case to determine which changes were due to selection and which were due to drift. As the example used for measuring the impact of selection and drift made clear, for the i-causalist the increase of allele A in the first case will result from selection (or from a mix of selection and drift depending on how many aas died because of their poor eyesight), while in the second case it will result totally from drift. In summary, for the e-causalist what goes on at the i-level does not matter, only S and E count. And, for the i-causalist, S and E don't matter, only what goes on at the i-level counts. (Of course an i-causalist with no information about what has happened at the i-level will make the same diagnosis as an e-causalist, but for her it will simply be an hypothesis).
This example shows how different the causes of the e-causalist are from those of the i-causalist. In fact, in this context WALM would  say that the e-causalist is wrong to call causes what he/she calls causes. Let us explain this point without getting involved in the many theories on causality and causes. The assertion that an instance of evolution is due to selection is usually understood as meaning that one or more selective factors have played a significant causal role in it. Considering as a cause what the e-causalist calls selection is upsetting because such selection has nothing to do with whether or not some selective factors have actually played any causal role. Of course, S is a cause of the resulting evolution since it is its starting point. And S is a situation of natural selection if the niche entails that individuals are likely to encounter often circumstances where having bad eyesight is a drawback. However, to result from S does not guarantee that selective factors have indeed played a significant causal role, it just makes it highly probable.
Here, it is decisive that the evolution resulting from S is not totally determined by S, a probabilistic cause, but only made more or less probable by it. With S as a starting point, not only it is not certain that the ensuing evolution will produce E, even if E is the most probable outcome of S, but even if the ensuing evolution ends up at E, it is not certain that this will be because the selective factors have effectively had the causal role that they were expected to have. It is always possible, even if not very probable, that evolution goes from S to E with the selective factors having played no role whatsoever, as in the second case of evolution. To sum up, the distinction between selection and drift that the e-causalist makes concerns not the causal role played by selective factors, but the type of statistical effect (at e-level) that results from a certain type of starting condition. It is in this sense that WALM draw a distinction between selection and drift understood as causes of evolution, and selection and drift understood as types of statistical effects. 
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^1	 . See M&A 2002, 60.
^2	  See Brandon 2005, where Millstein's position is qualified as a nonstarter (158).
^3	  That is what she told me in personal communication. A much more detailed discussion of Millstein's position is in a longer version of this paper.
^4	  M&A's argument can be summed up so, even if in detail it looks more complex by making use of a technical notion such as that of an homogeneous reference class, 
^5	  Stress is ours
^6	  See Brandon & Carson 1998 321 sq; Millstein 2002 48 sq.
^7	  A difference is determinist relative to some circumstances if its consequence for the type of effects under scrutiny is totally determined under these circumstances. Otherwise, it is probabilistic.   
^8	  We have chosen, of course, to consider the most simple case, the case where the causal impact of a selective factor makes a "determinist difference". But, it is also possible to measure causal impact if the difference between variants acts as a "probabilistic difference". Suppose O2* does not stop for sure before the ravine. Assume instead that O2* has a probability of 1/5 to fall in the ravine in such circumstances. Then, the causal impact of O2's bad eyesight on its death would not be equal to 1, but only to 4/5. Afterwards, it is an easy task to calculate the impact of bad eyesight in evolution relative to more individuals. Ten deaths due at 4/5 to bad eyesight are worth 8 deaths due totally to bad eyesight (10 x 4/5 = 40/5 =8).
^9	  See note 8.
^10	  In the longer version of this paper I already mentioned, I explain more in detail what the difference is between the biased coin case and the evolution-biased-by-a-selective-factor case, which explains why one can isolate  the causal role of the bias in the latter case but not in the former one.
^11	  See Beatty 1984, 192 sq; Brandon, 2005, 164 sq Millstein 2002, 40 sq; Pfeiffer 2005, 1140 sq., and the longer version of the paper mentioned in previous notes for this solution.
^12	  That is indeed what Brandon claims, see Brandon & Carson 1996, 324-35; Brandon 2005, 157.
